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Introduction
I am concerned that we scientists in conservation biology,
ecology, natural resources, environmental science, and
similar disciplines are collectively slipping into a morass
that risks marginalizing the contribution of science to
public policy. Advocating personal positions on ecologi-
cal policy issues has become widely tolerated as accept-
able professional behavior and is even encouraged by a
substantial fraction of the scientific community (Marris
2006; Scott et al. 2007). Scientists are uniquely qualified to
participate in public policy deliberations and they should,
but advocating for their policy preferences is not appro-
priate.
Despite an extensive debate in the literature on the
proper role of science and scientists in policy deliber-
ations, points of general agreement and specific differ-
ences often get lost amid the semantic confusion caused
by inconsistent definitions for key words or concepts
(Trudgill 2001). Table 1 provides the precise definitions
I have used throughout this essay.
Those of us who provide scientific information to deci-
sion makers and the public should strive to be more vig-
ilant, precise, demanding, and rigorous in distinguishing
between policy-neutral and policy-inculcated scientific in-
formation. Science is only one element of the complex
deliberations over major ecological policy questions that
take place in a democracy, but science is critical, and sci-
entists can and do play an important role (Sarewitz 2004;
Lackey 2006).
My unequivocal overall view on the role of scientists in
ecological policy and management is, first, that scientists
should contribute to the policy process. This is not only
the right thing to do, but we are also obligated to do so,
especially if our work is funded by public resources. I do
not hold with the notion that it is sufficient for scientists
to publish their findings solely as scholarly papers. The
assertion that scientists should be involved in providing
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and explaining the underlying science to help resolve im-
portant policy questions is, for me, a given.
Second, when scientists contribute to policy analysis
and implementation, they must exercise great care to play
an appropriate and clearly defined role. The interface be-
tween science and policy can be bewildering for many
of us who develop, provide, or interpret scientific infor-
mation. Working at the interface is also where many of
us mislead or confuse decision makers and the public be-
cause we let our personal policy preferences color our
science.
The formidable challenge of developing and providing
technical and scientific information to inform policy de-
liberations in an objective and relevant way is not unique
to ecological fields (Rykiel 2001). Whether one is work-
ing as a stock analyst in the research unit of a brokerage
firm (Boni & Womack 2003), a medical expert testifying
in malpractice trials (Caldwell 2005), a funding officer at
an international development agency that might finance
a proposed shrimp-farming operation (Be´ne´ 2005), or an
intelligence analyst within a government national security
agency (Armstrong 2002), the job of providing accurate,
relevant, and policy-neutral information is always a chal-
lenge.
Policy Context
Most of today’s ecological policy issues are politically con-
tentious, socially wrenching, and replete with scientific
uncertainty (Pielke 2004; Robinson 2006). Examples in-
clude reversing the decline of salmon in western North
America; deciding on the proper role of logging on public
lands; ameliorating the effects of human-caused climate
change; avoiding the extinction of species; and making
sense of the confusing policy choices surrounding no-
tions of sustainability.
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Table 1. Definitions of keywords used in this essay.
Normative science: science developed, presented, or interpreted based on an assumed, usually unstated, preference for a particular
policy or class of policy choices.
Policy: a decision or plan of action for accomplishing a desired outcome.
Policy analysis: formal assessment of the consequences and implications of the possible options for addressing a policy problem.
Policy advocacy: active, covert, or inadvertent support of a particular policy or class of policies.
Politics: process of debate, negotiation, and compromise for achieving a desired policy goal.
Preference: the preferred option from among a set of policy choices or alternatives.
Science: information gathered in a rational, systematic, testable, and reproducible manner.
Scientist: a person who generates or interprets scientific information or science.
Value: a core belief that tends to determine or shape personal or group policy preferences.
Ecological policy issues are inherently complex and are
often described by political scientists as being “wicked”
and “messy” (Salwasser 2004). All these issues share sev-
eral qualities: (1) complexity (they have multiple options
and trade-offs); (2) polarization (clashes between compet-
ing values are routine); (3) winners and losers (for each
policy choice, some interests will clearly benefit, some
will be harmed, and the consequences for others are un-
certain); (4) delayed consequences (the policy options
often provide no immediate “fix” and the benefits, if any,
of painful concessions may not be evident for decades);
(5) decision distortion (advocates often appeal to strongly
held values and distort or hide the real policy choices and
their consequences); (6) national versus regional conflict
(national priorities often differ substantially from those
at the local or regional level); and (7) misuse of scien-
tific information (science can end up an inappropriate
battleground because arguments over science are often
actually a surrogate venue for arguments over values and
preferences) (Lackey 2006). As if ecological policy issues
were not muddled enough, they often become further
clouded by skepticism about the motivation of scientists
and the accuracy of the scientific information they pro-
vide (Mills 2000; Pielke 2004). Most science is funded by
government agencies, businesses and corporations, and
myriad public and private interest and advocacy groups
(Sarewitz 2004). Each arguably has a vested interest in the
outcome of the debate and often promulgates “science”
that appears to support its favored position (Doremus
2005).
Science and Scientists
What is the appropriate role for scientists in policy mak-
ing? Our role is not described adequately under the cur-
rent and simplistic rubric of providing the best available
science or good science (Doremus & Tarlock 2005; Sulli-
van et al. 2006). Furthermore, scientists are often asked to
contribute scientific information in the midst of clashing
values, differing preferences, and opposing, often mutu-
ally exclusive, societal priorities (Lach et al. 2003; Pielke
2004). The public and bureaucratic discourse surround-
ing wicked, messy ecological policy issues is not for the
psychologically sensitive, those with thin skins, or any-
one with an aversion to being challenged scientifically or
professionally (Lackey 2006). Regardless of the reasons,
many scientists are reluctant to contribute beyond pub-
lishing their scientific contributions in scholarly journals
(Lach et al. 2003).
One common concern about the science–policy inter-
face is that some so-called science is imbued with policy
preferences (Trudgill 2001). Such science is labeled as
normative and its use is potentially an insidious kind of
scientific corruption (Lackey 2004). What separates nor-
mative science from “regular” science is that normative
science is developed, presented, or interpreted based on
a tacit, usually unstated, preference for a particular pol-
icy or class of policy choices. Normative science often
is not perceptibly normative to policy makers or even to
many scientists. The use of such science by scientists,
however, is stealth policy advocacy even if its use is not
intentional. As is argued by postmodernists, because all
science is socially constructed, science is value driven
and is, therefore, normative. My discomfort, however, is
not with the notion that science is a human enterprise
and therefore reflects the values of the participants, but
with science influenced by policy preferences.
Attempting to be both the provider of policy-neutral
science and an advocate for one’s personal policy prefer-
ences is laden with conflicts of interest and, if not care-
fully communicated, is potentially unethical (Mills 2000).
The same types of conflicts are present when one orga-
nizational unit attempts to serve as both the provider of
science and the regulator or manager of environmental
or natural resource (Sullivan et al. 2006). In government
bureaucracies it is an old and ongoing challenge to keep
the research and/or science enterprise independent and
policy neutral rather than manipulating it to help sell or
defend the agency’s policy decisions (Cohn 2005; Dore-
mus 2005).
Many writers who muse over the proper role of science
in ecological policy concentrate on the philosophical no-
tion of positivism and the fact-value distinction (Roebuck
& Phifer 1999). I subscribe to the view that science is
not free of values. It is, after all, a human enterprise, but
this fact does not make all science normative (Odenbaugh
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2003). Policy-neutral science strives to describe the world
accurately and is characterized by transparency, repro-
ducibility, and independence.
Using the terminology of philosophy, but without be-
coming mired in the nuances of philosophical analysis,
consider the simple but fundamental difference between
is (i.e., fact) and ought (i.e., preference) statements. Sci-
ence deals with the “is” world (facts about the past,
present, or future). For example, consider the distribu-
tion of a hypothetical bird found only in a limited geo-
graphic area and with an overall population level that ap-
pears to be declining at 5% per year. Such an observation
(the decline) is a scientific “is” statement. Whether this
fact documenting the population decline is something
that warrants a change in policy would be an “ought”
statement—a policy question. The policy world deals le-
gitimately and appropriately with the oughts and shoulds
(i.e., preferences): Should the decline of the bird popu-
lation be reversed? Science is restrained to statements of
is: The population is declining at 5% per year.
A current example that vividly illustrates the is/ought
dichotomy is the case of declining salmon populations in
the Pacific Northwest (U.S.A.). Many dams have a measur-
able effect on these populations. One oft-debated policy
option to help restore salmon runs is to remove or breach
dams. It is common for scientists to be asked to gauge the
likely effects of removing, or preserving, a particular dam
or set of dams—a legitimate and appropriate role for sci-
entists. There is, however, no scientific imperative to re-
move, or maintain, any dam for any ecological reason, in-
cluding salmon recovery. All of the policy options would
have ecological consequences, some of which may even
be catastrophic from a salmon perspective, but ecologi-
cal consequences are simply one element that the public
and decision makers must weigh in choosing from a set of
options. Understanding the likely ecological outcomes of
each choice is what the public and decision makers need
from scientists as they weigh policy alternatives. They
do not need personal opinions from scientists on which
policy option ought to be chosen.
How should scientists explain to the public and deci-
sion makers the relevant scientific information pertaining
to the likely effects of dam construction or removal? There
are obviously many ecological changes that will take place
when a dam is removed but what words should be used
to describe those changes? What point of ecological ref-
erence should be used, if any? Should benchmarks of any
kind be used?
Often I hear or read in scientific discourse words such
as degradation, improvement, good, and poor. Such
value-laden words should not be used to convey scien-
tific information because they imply a preferred ecologi-
cal state, a desired condition, a benchmark, or a preferred
class of policy options. Doing so is not science, it is pol-
icy advocacy. Subtle, perhaps unintentional, but it is still
policy advocacy. An argument is sometimes made that
such terms as degradation, good, and healthy can be
used in scientific reports if the terms are clearly defined,
measured, and monitored. Why use them unless you are
conveying the impression that one particular condition is
preferred policy wise? A forest that has been clearcut is de-
graded habitat from the perspective of Spotted Owls and
red tree voles, but it is improved habitat from the perspec-
tive of other species such as White-crowned Sparrows and
black-tailed deer. The science is exactly the same, only the
policy context differs. The appropriate science words are,
for example, change, increase, or decrease. These words
describe the scientific information in ways that are usu-
ally considered policy neutral. In short they convey no
policy preference and convey science in a policy-neutral
manner. Be clear, be candid, be brutally frank, but be pol-
icy neutral when providing science to the public, policy
makers, and others.
Scientists have a responsibility to correct misinterpreta-
tions of science, especially if it is being conveyed in ways
that imply support for particular policies. Even though
scientific information alone does not carry a policy im-
perative, making sure that policy advocates and policy
makers understand and use scientific information accu-
rately and honestly is essential (Doremus & Tarlock 2005).
Some scientists believe that not speaking up when sci-
ence is being misinterpreted or misused in policy delib-
erations is tantamount to dereliction of duty (Karr 2006).
Conversely, scientists have an obligation to avoid convey-
ing overtly or covertly any policy preference. Using nor-
mative science is a case of covertly advocating a policy
preference. Among some conservation biologists, ecolo-
gists, and those from similar professional disciplines, the
implicit policy preference is assumed to be that ecosys-
tems unaltered by humans are inherently good, or at least
preferable to ecosystems altered by humans (van Houtan
2006). Unstated, but implied, is that the less altered an
ecosystem the better. But science leads to no preferred
state or to any inherently good condition. In short, there
is no scientific imperative for adopting any policy option
(McCoy & Atwood 2005).
There is no universally accepted list of implicit policy
preferences that is typically imbedded within normative
science in ecological and environmental disciples. The
following policy preferences are common: human-caused
extinctions are inherently bad and should be avoided;
unaltered ecosystems are preferable to altered; reducing
complexity in ecosystems is undesirable; natural evolu-
tion is good, human intervention is not; more biological
diversity is preferable to less biodiversity; and native or
indigenous species are preferable to non-native species.
These examples (and their converses) are each valid pol-
icy preferences, but not one is a scientific imperative
(Matsuda 1997).
How widespread is normative science in disciplines
such as conservation biology, ecology, fisheries, wildlife,
and forestry? In my experience with a number of different
Conservation Biology
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ecological policy issues, normative science is frequent. I
often observe biological diversity or ecological integrity
calculated solely on the number of native species. Except
for someone doing truly basic, independent, or nonap-
plied research, the decision to include, or exclude, ex-
otic or non-native species in biodiversity calculations is
a policy choice and not a choice for scientists to make.
That is not to say the native species and exotic species are
interchangeable; they are not, but neither native species
nor exotic species are inherently preferable in a scientific
sense.
Some scientific societies and other professional organi-
zations assert that biological diversity is inherently good.
Understanding the role of biological diversity may be im-
portant to explaining ecosystem structure and function
and even essential for sorting out evolutionary processes,
but a value judgment must be invoked to define certain
levels of biological diversity as inherently good or that
increasing biodiversity is preferable, policy wise, to de-
creasing biodiversity (Meine et al. 2006). Such a value
judgment reflects a specific policy preference, but there
are competing policy preferences that are also valid. Fur-
thermore, how should those scientific and professional
societies that promulgate explicit ecological policy pref-
erences promote those preferences? Should their journals
only publish papers that accept their policy preferences?
Should the society accept advertising that does not ex-
plicitly support their stated policy positions? Is it realistic
to expect outsiders to accept science published in their
journals as being policy neutral? Once policy preferences
are rooted in the core of the scientific enterprise, it is not
clear to me how scientific independence and credibility
can survive over the long term.
Another example of the inappropriate blending of sci-
ence and policy preference is the application of the
metaphor of ecosystem health—a common, even perva-
sive, use of normative science (Lackey 2003). To most
proponents of ecosystem health, the alluring feature of
the human health metaphor is that people have an inher-
ent understanding of personal health. We each have an
idea of what constitutes a healthy person in contrast to a
sick person. By extension most people envision instinc-
tively a healthy ecosystem as being pristine or at least
appearing to be minimally altered by human action (e.g.,
a primordial forest, a wilderness lake, or perhaps a pas-
toral landscape). Thus, it is often argued that ecosystem
health is intuitively grasped by the general public, policy
officials, and scientists.
Applying the notion of human health to ecosystems
provides a simple paradigm for viewing ecological policy
questions. By implication, adopting the metaphor also
defines what type of information (i.e., scientific) is nec-
essary to help decision makers (Lackey 2003). When I
am sick, I seek the technical expertise of a medical prac-
titioner. Therefore, applying the same metaphor, when
an ecosystem is sick it follows that an ecosystem health
professional ought to be consulted. Ecosystem health is a
value-driven policy construct. Yet often it is passed off as
science to unsuspecting policy makers and the public.
Who decides what is the preferred state of an ecosys-
tem? Arguably there is a consensus that a healthy human
is preferable to a sick one, but what is the analog for
ecosystems? Sometimes and in acknowledgment of the
intellectual weakness of the notion of ecosystem health,
scientists assume a preferred state but hide behind a cloak
of scholarly precision with statements such as “We used
a precise definition of ecosystem health to analyze the
ecosystem, but others misused or misinterpreted the re-
sults.” and “We cannot be responsible for how others use
the results.” True, but why use the metaphor if people
are likely to misuse the scientific information?
Think what the average recipient of scientific informa-
tion actually hears when data or assessments are pack-
aged or presented under the rubric of ecosystem health.
As with humans, healthy is good. The opposite condition
must be unhealthy, which is surely undesirable in ecosys-
tems as it is in humans. Is this a fair way to describe policy
alternatives? One person’s damaged ecosystem is another
person’s improved ecosystem. A healthy ecosystem can
be either a malaria-infested swamp or the same land con-
verted to an intensively managed rice paddy. Neither con-
dition can be seen as healthy except through the lens of
an individual’s values and policy preferences (Freyfogle
& Newton 2002).
Should a healthy ecosystem be defined as the ecological
state that existed a 1000 years ago, just prior to 1492, or
at the end of last week? The answer is a value judgment,
a policy choice, perhaps the product of political delib-
erations, but it is not solely a scientific decision (Hunter
1996). Scientists can and should assess the ecological con-
sequences of adopting each possible policy or manage-
ment goal (i.e., various alternative definitions of “healthy”
ecosystem), but the choice of which state of the ecosys-
tem is the desired goal is a societal one (Rykiel 2001).
Politically, from what I observe, the use of normative
science cuts across the ideological spectrum. It seems no
less common coming from the political Left or Right, from
the Greens or the Libertarians. Regardless of the virtue of
the policy preference, normative science is a corruption
of science.
Fair or not, it is true that some scientists, at least as per-
ceived by many people, appear to operate as policy advo-
cates, not as unimpeachable providers of policy-neutral
information. They are observed, for example, publicly ar-
guing for, or against, the Kyoto Protocol, the Convention
on Biological Diversity, legislation to protect marine re-
sources, or a controversial housing development. In my
own area of research, for example, many scientists sign
petitions to remove, or preserve, a particular salmon-
killing dam for reasons that sound like science, read like
science, are presented by people who cloak themselves
in the accouterments of science but who are actually
Conservation Biology
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offering nothing but policy advocacy masquerading as
science.
Conclusion
We must achieve within ecological and natural resource
professions a clear understanding of the distinctions be-
tween science and policy and an understanding of the
appropriate roles and responsibilities of science, scien-
tists, and policy advocacy. So, what specifically should a
vigilant scientist do to assure that the proper roles of sci-
ence, scientists, and policy makers are understood and
followed? First, be sensitive to the boundary between
scientific or technical issues and value judgments. The
boundary between policy neutrality and policy advocacy
may not always be a bright line, but be especially vigilant
when the line becomes dim.
Second, when the major points of dissention in a policy
debate are over values and preferences (the usual case),
try to exhort decision makers to focus on these often frac-
tious elements of the decision making process rather than
the technical and scientific aspects. Debates of questions
of science often end up serving as a surrogate polemic
for the inability (or unwillingness) of decision makers to
adjudicate unpleasant value and preference trade-offs. Do
not fall into the trap of substituting debate over scientific
information and interpretation of data for debate over
which values and preferences will carry the day.
Third, be brutally honest with decision makers about
the technical feasibility of each possible policy option and
the uncertainties associated with the resulting ecological
consequences. Often, the most useful input scientists can
provide is to identify the estimated probability of success
(for achieving the stated policy goal) for each of the var-
ious competing policy options.
Many of today’s ecological policy issues are con-
tentious, socially divisive, and full of conundrums. They
are, however, typical of those that professional ecologists
will confront for the foreseeable future. Those of us who
provide information to help inform the participants in-
volved in ecological policy debates must be cognizant of
and appreciate the importance of scientific information,
but in a democracy we also must recognize the reality
that scientific information is just one element in complex
political deliberations.
To policy makers, I say be alert. Call our hand when
you observe us overstepping our role as scientists and
slipping into stealth policy advocacy. Scientific informa-
tion is too important to the resolution of vital, divisive,
and controversial ecological issues to allow some scien-
tists to marginalize science through its misuse. Do not
allow the overzealous among us to corrupt the entire sci-
ence enterprise.
To scientists, I say get involved, but play the appropri-
ate role. If you choose to advocate your personal policy
preferences, make it clear to everyone involved that you
have stepped out of a scientific role and into the role of
policy advocate. In playing the role of policy advocate,
be aware that your values and preferences inherently are
no more (or less) important than other participants in
the policy debate. To do otherwise is to corrupt both the
political process and scientific enterprise.
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